experienced unusual economic distress. More than half of all bank failures occurred in Texas alone. Texas and other energy-producing states experienced high numbers of bank failures following a sharp drop in energy prices and household incomes in the mid-1980s. Later, in the early 1990s, New England states had numerous bank failures when state incomes and real estate prices declined. Analysts argued that the concentration of bank failures in regions experiencing high levels of economic distress reflected the geographically fragmented structure of the U.S. banking system in which banks were not permitted to operate branches in more than one state (e.g., Calomiris, 1992; Horvitz, 1992; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation [FDIC], 1997) . Bank failures were especially numerous in Texas and other states that had long restricted branch banking within their borders. Many states eased intrastate branching restrictions during the 1980s, and the RiegleNeal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 subsequently removed federal restrictions on interstate branching. 3 Proponents of deregulation argued that the removal of branching restrictions would encourage banks to diversify geographically, which would lessen the impact of local economic shocks on bank performance.
This article examines the characteristics of bank failures during 2007-10 and investigates whether the geographic distribution of failures reflected differences in local economic conditions. The removal of restrictions on branch banking, both within and across state lines, has been followed by substantial consolidation of the U.S. banking industry. Bank failures and mergers have reduced the number of U.S. banks from a postwar peak of 14,496 in 1984 to fewer than half that number today, and many banks now operate extensive branching networks. None theless, even now most banks have offices in no more than a few states, and many have offices in just a single market. Although banks can reduce their vulnerability to local economic shocks by participating in loans made in other markets, investing in securities, and using other means, the large number of banks that operate predominantly in a single market and serve mainly a local clientele suggests that bank failures are likely to be more numerous in locations experiencing adverse economic shocks. 4 We compare the characteristics of failing and non-failing banks during 2007-10, focusing on differences in size and branch operations. We derive state-level bank failure rate measures using branch-level data, which allows us to capture the impact of interstate branching on state-level failure rates. We then investigate the correlation between state bank failure rates and measures of state economic conditions, including measures of distress in housing markets, as well as personal income growth and unemployment rates. Finally, we compare our findings for 2007-10 with evidence on bank failures during the 1980s and early 1990s. We find that, as in earlier periods, during 2007-10 bank failure rates typically were higher in states experiencing more severe economic distress. Thus, even though most branching restrictions were removed more than a decade ago, the regional patterns of bank failures during indicate that many banks remain vulnerable to local economic shocks.
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4 This article does not address why many banks choose not to operate in more than one market. However, for some banks, the costs of managing operations in multiple markets might outweigh the potential benefits of geographic diversification. Emmons, Gilbert, and Yeager (2004) find that small, community banks could reduce their failure risk more by simply increasing their size, regardless of where growth occurs, than by expanding into multiple markets. However, Berger and DeYoung (2006) find that, over time, advances in information-processing technology have reduced the costs of managing far-flung operations, suggesting that banks increasingly will find it advantageous to operate in multiple markets.
The next section profiles U.S. bank failures during 2007-10. First, we briefly describe the failures and near-failures of very large financial organizations that succumbed to the collapse of the U.S. housing and mortgage markets. We then focus explicitly on commercial bank and savings institution failures and compare failing and nonfailing banks in terms of size and branching characteristics. We similarly compare failing and non-failing commercial banks during 1987-92. Subsequently, we derive state-level bank failure rates and investigate the correlation between failure rates and measures of the housing boom and subsequent bust, as well as other measures of state economic conditions. Again, we compare the recent experience with that of 1987-92. The final section summarizes our findings and conclusions.
PROFILE OF BANKS THAT FAILED DURING 2007-10

Large Financial Institution Failures and Near-Failures
The recent financial crisis and recession was punctuated by several high-profile financial failures and near-failures. This article focuses on the failures of commercial banks and savings institutions. However, we briefly describe the failures and near-failures of some other large financial firms during the financial crisis and recession of 2007-10. The financial crisis was triggered when the housing boom ended and house prices began to fall in many markets. By 2006-07, falling house prices had led to rising home mortgage delinquency rates, which lowered the profits of mortgage lenders, such as Countrywide Financial Corporation, Washington Mutual Corporation, and GMAC, Incorporated. All three of these bank holding companies incurred enormous losses on the mortgage portfolios of their subsidiary banks. lacked sufficient assets to serve as collateral for a rescue loan and the firm was forced to file for bankruptcy in September 2008. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are governmentsponsored enterprises that provide support for the housing market by purchasing home mortgages from loan originators. As government-sponsored corporations, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac traditionally enjoyed lower borrowing costs than most private firms because many investors believed that the federal government would stand behind the firms' debts even though they were privately held companies. Their implicit federal guarantees allowed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to become highly leveraged by borrowing heavily to invest in large portfolios of mortgages and mortgagebacked securities. Both firms grew rapidly during the past decade and became significant purchasers of nonprime mortgage-backed securities (Leonnig, 2008; Greenspan, 2010) . The increase in subprime mortgage delinquency rates and decline in the value of subprime mortgage-backed securities quickly eroded the thin capital of both firms, and they were placed under federal government conservatorship in September 2008. 8 Since then, the firms have required billions of dollars of capital from the federal government to remain going concerns.
AIG is a large financial conglomerate with global operations. The traditional business of AIG is insurance-automobile, life, and so on. AIG also owns a federally chartered savings bank (AIG Bank, FSB). AIG's unregulated activities, notably the underwriting of credit default insurance, produced substantial losses when the housing market slumped badly in 2007-08. These unregulated operations had grown so large that government officials feared that AIG's sudden collapse could impose severe losses on other firms and seriously impair the functioning of the entire financial system. To avoid this outcome the U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve provided AIG with loans and a capital injection in October 2008 when it appeared that the firm would default on its outstanding debts. 9 Washington Mutual Bank, a federally chartered savings bank with some $300 billion of assets, was declared insolvent by the Office of Thrift Supervision in September 2008 and placed under the receivership of the FDIC. No other bank with more than $100 billion of assets was liquidated or sold by the FDIC during 2007-10. However, among other large bank holding companies, both Citigroup and Bank of America received special assistance from the federal government in the form of capital, portfolio guarantees, and liquidity access; and Wachovia and National City were acquired by other bank holding companies when it became clear that neither remained viable on its own. In providing capital and guarantees to Citigroup, Bank of America, and AIG, as well as assistance to facilitate the acquisition of troubled firms such as Bear Stearns, the Federal Reserve and Treasury Department sought to promote stability of the financial system by avoiding possible systemic repercussions should such a large financial firm fail or declare bankruptcy. 10
Comparison of Failed and Non-Failing Commercial Banks and Savings Institutions
Next we focus on the characteristics of commercial banks and savings institutions that were declared insolvent by their primary regulator and whose deposits were either liquidated or sold to another institution by the FDIC. With some $300 billion of assets and $189 billion of deposits when it was closed by the Office of Thrift Supervision, Washington Mutual Bank was by far the largest bank failure in U.S. history. Only five banks had more assets than Washington Mutual when it failed, and Washington Mutual was nearly 10 times larger in terms of total assets than the nextlargest bank to fail between January 2007 and March 2010. Between January 1, 2007, and March 31, 2010, 206 commercial banks and savings institutions (savings banks and savings and loan associations, hereafter "thrifts") were declared insolvent by their primary regulator and either closed or sold, in whole or in part, to another institution. 12 This total includes Washington Mutual but does not include AIG, Bank of America, Citigroup, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, GMAC, and other firms that received special government assistance in the form of loans, guarantees, or capital injections to avoid failure. It also does not include Bear Stearns or Lehman Brothers, which were not depository institutions or bank holding companies, and it does not include Countrywide Financial Corporation, National City Corporation, Wachovia Corporation, and other financially troubled bank or thrift holding companies that were acquired by other banks without government assistance. Table 1 Most banks that failed between 2007 and 2010 were much smaller than Washington Mutual both in total assets and deposits and in numbers of branches and numbers of states with branch offices. The mean total assets and deposits of failing banks other than Washington Mutual were $1.2 billion and $824 million, respectively. Reflecting the highly skewed distribution of bank assets, median assets and deposits were much smaller, at $263 million and $204 million, respectively. By comparison, among non-failing banks, mean total assets and deposits were $1.2 billion and $695 million, respectively, and median total assets and deposits were $119 million and $97 million. 15 Thus, among failed banks other than Washington Mutual, mean total assets and deposits of failing banks were similar to those of non-failing banks, but median assets and deposits were considerably larger than those of non-failing banks. Figure 3 shows kernel density plots for the natural log (ln) of total assets of failing and nonfailing banks during 2007-10, based on data for June 2006. The figure shows that the banks and thrifts that failed during 2007-10 tended to be larger than non-failing institutions over the range of asset sizes most commonly observed (though as noted, five non-failing banks held more total assets than Washington Mutual). By contrast, during the wave of bank failures of the late 1980s and early 1990s, the commercial banks that failed tended to be smaller than non-failing commercial banks ( Figure 4 ). 16 Figure 5 shows kernel density plots for the natural log (ln) of total assets for failed commercial banks, failed savings institutions, and non-failing banks (both commercial banks and savings institutions) as of June 2006. As shown, savings institutions that failed between 2007 and 2010 tended to be much larger than both commercial banks that failed and non-failing banks. Thrifts tend to specialize in home mortgage lending, and many grew rapidly during the housing boom. Several
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12 A list of failed banks since 2000 is available from the FDIC (www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html).
13 Our data are from the Summary of Deposits (www2.fdic.gov/sod/index.asp), which provides branch-level information.
14 Of the 162 commercial banks that failed, 109 were state-chartered non-Federal Reserve member banks, 21 were state-chartered Federal Reserve members, and 32 were national banks.
15 Data for non-failing banks include banks that were acquired after June 2006 and banks that survived through March 2010. 16 As noted previously, our data for 2007-10 include both commercial banks and savings institutions. However, comparable data on savings institution failures are not available for the late 1980s and early 1990s and, hence, the densities shown in Figure 4 for 1987-92 are based exclusively on data for commercial banks.
4 0 1 large thrifts failed when house prices began to fall and mortgage delinquencies rose. Table 2 lists the 20 largest failed banks in terms of total assets on June 30, 2006. Of the 20 largest failures, 11, including Washington Mutual Bank, were savings institutions. Of the 36 thrifts that failed during 2007-10, 16 (44 percent) had at least $1 billion of assets. By contrast, of the 162 commercial banks that failed, only one (Colonial Bank of Montgomery, Alabama) had more than $10 billion of assets, and only 22 (14 percent) had more than $1 billion of assets. As noted previously, in a few cases the federal government intervened to ensure that a very large, systemically significant commercial bank would not fail. In addition, several thrifts experienced large declines in total assets in the months between June 2006 and their failure dates.
Next we compare failed and non-failing banks on the basis of the number and location of branch offices. The sharp increase in bank failures during the 1980s and the apparent vulnerability of banks to sudden changes in local economic conditions led many states and, ultimately, the federal government to relax restrictions on branch banking. 17 Branching proponents argue that geographic restrictions on bank location contribute to banking system instability by making it more costly for banks to diversify or exploit economies of scale. 18 Although banks can achieve geographic diversification through loan participations, brokered deposits, and other techniques, most banks served mainly a local loan and deposit market before branching restrictions were relaxed.
Branching deregulation promoted a substantial consolidation of the U.S. banking industry and the advent of banks with interstate branches. The largest U.S. banks operate thousands of branch offices across several states. 17 Kroszner and Strahan (1999) Table 1 , the median number of branches operated by banks that failed during 2007-10, other than Washington Mutual, was four. Further, most banks that failed had branches over only a limited geographic area: The median failed bank operated branches in just three zip codes across two counties in a single state. A lack of widespread branching is not, however, a distinguishing characteristic of banks that failed. The median non-failing bank operated only three branches located in two zip codes in a single county in a single state.
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STATE BANK FAILURE RATES
The advent of interstate branch banking has made it more difficult to discern the relationship between changes in local economic conditions and bank performance. However, as noted previously, most banks continue to operate in a limited number of banking markets in a single state.
Hence, it remains interesting to consider the extent to which bank failures are associated with changes in local or regional economic conditions. We identified the home state of every bank that failed between January 1, 2007, and March 31, 2010, and calculated state-level failure rates as (i) the ratio of the number of banks headquartered in a state that failed to the total number of banks headquartered in that state as of June 30, 2006; and (ii) the ratio of the deposits held by failed banks in a state to the total amount of deposits held by all banks in that state as of June 30, 2006. We used annual branch-level data on total deposits for all U.S. banks to calculate the deposits-based failure rate. 20 This measure captures the influence on a state's failure rate of the deposits in branches of banks that are headquartered in another state. Figure 6 shows the distribution of the failure rate (ratio of failed to total banks) across U.S. states. Georgia had the highest number of failures, with 36 (of 346 banks), but Nevada experienced the highest failure rate, with 5 of 28 banks failing. Arizona, California, and Oregon also had failure rates of at least 8.5 percent. Fif teen states had no bank failures during this period, including six states in the Northeast (Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont), four southeastern states (Kentucky, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Tennessee), and two Great Plains states (Montana and North Dakota). Figure 7 shows the distribution of the depositsbased failure rate measure across states. The impact of interstate branching and differences in the sizes of failed banks across states is apparent. For example, only two small banks chartered in New York failed, giving the state a bank failure rate of only 0.99 percent. However, because of the failure of Washington Mutual Bank, which operated 209 branches with some $15 billion of deposits in New York, 1.95 percent of the state's bank deposits were in banks that failed. California, Nevada, and Washington are other states for which 
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STATE BANK FAILURE RATES AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
The recent decline in U.S. house prices was the largest and most widespread since the Great Depression. Mortgage delinquency rates rose throughout the United States and were a proximate cause of the financial crisis and recession. The decline in U.S. house prices was particularly problematic for savings institutions-entities that historically have focused on residential mortgage lending. However, many commercial banks have increased their real estate lending in recent years because of increased competition in commercial lending and apparent profit opportunities in real estate lending. 21 For example, between December 31, 1996, and December 31, 2006, real estate loans (both residential and commercial) rose from 39.5 percent to 57.4 percent of total U.S. 21 Small, community banks traditionally have dominated small business lending, where close proximity and personal relationships have been important for ascertaining the creditworthiness of potential borrowers. However, advances in information-processing technology have increased competition in local bank markets by making quantifiable information about potential borrowers more readily available (Petersen and Rajan, 2002) . In addition, the easing of branching restrictions and other entry barriers increased competition in local banking markets.
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Bank Failure Rates (2007-10) commercial bank loans while commercial and industrial loans fell from 25.2 percent to 19.0 percent of total loans. 22 Although house prices fell throughout the United States, distress in housing and mortgage markets was especially acute in states that had experienced large increases in house prices in preceding years. Correlations reported in Table 3 show that states with large increases in house States that experienced the largest increases in house prices during the boom, or the largest declines during the bust, had the highest bank failure rates, as did those with the most rapid growth in subprime mortgage loans and total real estate loans. Not surprisingly, since the delinquency rates on subprime mortgages are much higher than those on prime loans, state bank failure rates are also highly positively correlated with the increase in residential mortgage loan delinquency rates between 2006 and 2009. 24 Many states with large declines in house prices also experienced relatively large declines in personal income and gross state product and relatively large increases in unemployment rates. For example, Florida and Arizona were the only states where real per capita personal income fell more than 7 percent between 2006 and 2009; along with Nevada and California, they were the only states where the decline in house prices between 2007 and 2009 exceeded 30 percent. House Price Index percent change ( Similarly, Michigan had the smallest increase in gross state product between 2006 and 2008 and had the fifth-largest decline in house prices, 17 percent, behind Arizona, California, Florida, and Nevada. As shown in Table 4 25 Lastly, we investigated the association between market entry restrictions on banks and state bank failure rates. As noted previously, many states relaxed restrictions on branching and began to permit entry by out-of-state bank holding companies during the 1970s and 1980s, and a federal prohibition on interstate branching was removed in 1994. However, several states retained limits on entry, such as caps on the share of a state's deposits that a single bank can hold and requirements that a bank seeking to enter a new market must do so by acquiring an existing bank. Rice and Strahan (2010) find that these types of entry barriers reduce the supply of credit to small business borrowers and increase interest rates on loans by 25 to 45 basis points. Similarly, Favara and Imbs (2009) find that relaxing restrictions on bank entry increases the number and volume of home mortgage loans originated by commercial banks within a state and increases house prices. Several studies find that branching and other entry barriers affect state-level measures of economic performance. For example, Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) find that relaxation of state branching restrictions in the 1970s and 1980s significantly increased state real income growth rates. However, estimates of the impact of deregulation on growth from studies that account for either the possibility that slowly growing states were more likely to deregulate (Freeman, 2002) or spatial dependence in state growth rates (Garrett, Wagner, and Wheelock, 2007) find considerably smaller effects of deregulation on state income growth. More recently, Acharya, Imbs, and Sturgess (2009) find that branching restrictions limit the scope of banks to pursue efficient diversification, which in turn limits the diversification of investment activity within a state.
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The literature concludes that branching and other entry regulations can inhibit efficient diversification by banks and affect the cost and supply of credit for borrowers. To the extent that diversification is limited, entry barriers might make banks more vulnerable to local economic distress, as discussed previously. Entry barriers might also promote instability by protecting inefficient banks from competitive forces. On the other hand, entry barriers might allow incumbent banks to earn higher-than-normal profits, which would tend to encourage conservative practices and thereby keep bank failure rates lower than failure rates in states with low entry barriers. 26 Hence, the relationship between entry barriers and bank failure rates is an empirical question. Rice and Strahan (2010) construct an index of bank entry restrictions for each U.S. state, ranging from 0 for no restrictions to a maximum of 4 for states that impose the most restrictions on bank entry. Table 4 reports the correlation of values of this index for December 2006 with state-level bank failure rates for 2007-10. The correlation is positive, indicating that bank failure rates were higher in states that imposed more entry restrictions, but not statistically significant at conventional significance levels. Hence, we find some weak evidence that entry restrictions contributed to the high bank failure rates observed in some states.
COMPARISON WITH 1987-92
The close association between state bank failure rates and economic conditions during 2007-10 25 We calculated the business bankruptcy rate as the number of States with large declines in real estate values tended to sustain longer and deeper declines in economic activity-and more bank distressthan did other states (Wheelock, 2006) . A similar phenomenon occurred in the 1920s, when falling commodity prices reduced agricultural incomes and caused the failure of thousands of banks located in farm states and other rural areas. States where farm land values and cultivated acreage had expanded the most during boom years surrounding World War I experienced the highest farm and bank failure rates subsequently (Alston, Grove, and Wheelock, 1994) . 
CONCLUSION
The removal of legal restrictions on branch banking, first by many states in the 1970s and 1980s and then by the federal government in the 1990s, led to a substantial consolidation of the U.S. banking industry. By 2009, the number of commercial banks in the United States was less than half what it had been in 1984, when the number of banks reached its postwar peak. Still, because many U.S. banks operate only a few branches in a single or small number of markets, the geographic distribution of bank failures is likely to reflect, to some extent, regional differences in economic conditions. Historically, adverse shocks caused locally high numbers of bank failures, as in Texas and New England in 28 However, commercial real estate market conditions may have played important roles in both periods. Spong and Sullivan (1999, pp. 73 and 74) note that between 1981 and 1986, tax laws allowed investors to use an accelerated depreciation schedule for real property, which tended to inflate commercial property values. The removal of these tax shelters "helped to send the industry into a downward spiral," which was "at the forefront of many of the banking problems of the 1980s and early 1990s." Unfortunately, as noted previously, state-level data on commercial real estate market conditions are not available to examine the correlation of commercial real estate conditions with bank failure rates.
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29 Here we use an index that takes a value of 1 for states that allowed unlimited statewide branching, 2 for states that permitted limited branching, and 3 for states that prohibited branching altogether (as of 1986:Q4).
the late 1980s and early 1990s. Small banks with limited geographic diversification have been especially vulnerable to local economic shocks and have tended to fail in higher numbers than larger banks. In several respects, the geographic patterns of recent U.S. bank failures have been similar to those of past episodes. During 2007-10, bank failure rates were higher in states with the largest declines in personal income and gross state product and the largest increases in unemployment rates. Failure rates were also higher in states experiencing the largest declines in house prices and the largest increases in home mortgage delinquency rates. Those states also had the largest increases in house prices and subprime mortgages before 2007. On average, the percentages of bank loans and assets devoted to home mortgages and mortgage-backed securities rose during the housing boom, which made banks more vulnerable to the subsequent decline in house prices. Unlike previous episodes, banks that failed during this episode tended to be somewhat larger on average than non-failing banks. In particular, reflecting the important role played by home mortgage distress during 2007-10, several large savings institutions failed.
We find that bank failure rates were only modestly correlated with restrictions on intrastate branch banking or bank entry, both in the recent episode and during the failure wave of 1987-92. However, evidence that bank failure rates during 2007-10 were closely correlated with measures of state economic conditions suggests that the long-standing prohibition of interstate branching, though eliminated more than a decade ago, continues to influence the market structure and geographic distribution of bank failures today. 
